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In May of 2001, the United States
Supreme Court issued Buckhannon Board
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources
(Buckhannon).1 The Court held that the
“catalyst theory” is no longer a viable
method for a plaintiff to claim “prevailing
party” status for purposes of an award of
attorney’s fees under the two civil rights
statutes at issue.  Briefly, the “catalyst
theory” is one of four main methods used
by environmental and other public 
interest practitioners (“public interest
lawyers”) to seek attorney fees upon the
termination of a successful lawsuit.  While
jurisdictions may differ in the test applied
to determine whether a plaintiff qualifies
as a “prevailing party” via the “catalyst
theory,” generally a plaintiff must demon-
strate that (1) the lawsuit stated a gen-
uine claim, (2) the lawsuit was a ‘substan-
tial’ or significant’ cause in the defen-
dant’s decision to voluntarily change its
conduct, and (3) defendant provided
some of the benefit sought by the law-
suit.2 The other three methods sanc-
tioned by courts which allow a litigant to
obtain fees include (1) a favorable final
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1. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
2. Compare Stewart v Hannon, 675 F.2d 846,
851 (7th Cir. 1981) (identifying a two factor test: (1)
judicial order on the merits, (2) the
procuring of a consent decree, and (3)
contracting for a private settlement.
In its decision, the Court went
beyond merely disapproving the basis for
awarding fees via the “catalyst theory.”
Addressing an issue outside the scope of
the case, the Court strongly hinted that it
was invalidating the rule - previously
approved in every circuit - that a plaintiff
can “prevail” and collect attorney’s fees by
obtaining a favorable and enforceable set-
tlement.3 Concern among public interest
lawyers could not be greater.  If extended
to other fee-shifting statutes employing
similar language, the decision is expected
to have several effects that will undermine
the policies endorsed by Congress and
the courts alike of encouraging citizen
enforcement of federal laws to protect the
environment and civil rights.  Among
these effects are:
1. Allowing agencies and corporations
to elude compliance with the law
until caught, and then simply comply
once the violation is detected to
moot the case and avoid all conse-
quences of its noncompliance;
2. Permitting violators to test judicial
resolve to enforce the law and, once
it looks unfavorable, opt for “volun-
tary compliance,” avoiding full conse-
quences of its noncompliance. 
3. Tilting the balance of litigation risk in
some cases sharply against those
who enforce the law in favor of those
who violate it.
4. Depending on how it’s interpreted,
Buckhannon may actually discourage
settlements.
At issue in this article is whether the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Buckhannon
extends to the Clean Water Act.4 It is
important to note at the outset that
applying the Buckhannon test is a two-part
procedure.  First, a court must decide
whether Buckhannon applies to the statute
at issue.  If Buckhannon applies, the court
must then consider the facts of the case in
front of it and decide whether the resolu-
tion contains the necessary judicial impri-
matur required by the Court.  This article
focuses only on the former aspect,
because one needs the facts of a case to
determine the latter aspect.
II.  The Clean Water Act’s Fee’s Provision
The fee-shifting provision of the
Clean Water Act (CWA) states that a court
may award costs of litigation “to any pre-
vailing or substantially prevailing party when-
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whether the litigation benefited the plaintiff and
members of the class, and (2) whether the lawsuit
acted as a catalyst, or was a material factor in the
defendant’s decision to change the disputed prac-
tices and therefore provide, in substantial part, the
relief sought.), and Southwest Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp. 2d 944 (9th Cir.
2001) (also identifying a two-part test: (1) whether
the lawsuit was causally linked - i.e., the lawsuit
was a catalytic factor - to securing the benefit
obtained, and (2) the benefit obtained was
required by law as opposed to a gratuitous act by
the defendant), with Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104,
1111 (D.C. Cir 1986) (requiring “some basis in law
for the benefits ultimately received by [a success-
ful] litigant”).  See also Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627-
28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
3.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604-606.
4.  The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(hereinafter cited as the Clean Water Act) § 505, 33
U.S.C. §1365 (2001).
award is appropriate.”5 There are two ele-
ments at work here.  First, a court must
determine whether a party qualifies as a
“prevailing or substantially prevailing
party.”  Once determined in the affirma-
tive, the statute appears to give the court
complete discretion to award fees “when-
ever . . . appropriate.”6 Each element is
addressed below.
A.  “Prevailing or Substantially
Prevailing Party”—The Arguments
For and Against Buckhannon’s
Extension
As mentioned, the Court’s decision in
Buckhannon involved only “prevailing
party” language, a term the Court deemed
“a term of art.”7 Because the CWA’s fees
provision employs modifying language,
the issue becomes whether Buckhannon
extends to “substantially prevailing” parties.  
Buckhannon’s ambiguity regarding its
limitations left much room to argue either
for or against extension.  The following
arguments are expected from plaintiffs
and defendants on this issue.
1.  The Citation to Marek v. Chesney
Argument
The Supreme Court recognized that
congressional use of the term “prevailing
party” was not unique to the statutes at
issue in Buckhannon and provided exam-
ples of other statutes that employ the
term.8 However, when citing these exam-
ples, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, inexplicably cited to the entire
appendix of Justice Brennan’s dissenting
opinion in Marek v. Chesney,9 and conclud-
ed by stating: “[w]e have interpreted these
fee-shifting provisions consistently.”  The
Marek appendix catalogued over one hun-
dred fee-shifting statutes containing virtu-
ally every variation of fee-shifting lan-
guage, including the CWA.10 Thus, cham-
pions for Buckhannon’s extension will con-
clude that the CWA falls within the rul-
ing’s reach.11
However, a strong argument can be
made that the Court was simply citing to
Marek to provide a comprehensive list of
statutes containing “prevailing party”
statutes.  This explanation is consistent
with Buckhannon’s failure to specifically
cite non-“prevailing party” statutes and
the Court’s endorsement for extending its
ruling to the Civil Rights Act of 1984, the
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act
of 1976 and Hensley, all of which exclusive-
ly employ or discuss “prevailing party”
language.
The argument that the Court’s cita-
tion to the Marek appendix extends
Buckhannon to the CWA should fail for sev-
eral reasons.  First, it places too much
emphasis on a citation that is inconsis-
tent with the listed examples.  In addition,
the Court’s conclusion that it has inter-
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5.  Clean Water Act §505(d).
6.  This grant of discretion has become known
as the “wherever appropriate” standard.
7.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
8.  Id. at 602-03 (citing The Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2002e-5(k); The Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e); The
Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988; and generally, Marek v. Chesney, 473
U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985)).
9.  Id. 
10.  Marek, 473 U.S. at 33.
11.  See Union of Needlestrades, Indus. and
Textile Employees, AFL-CIO, CLC v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 202 F. Supp.
2d 265,274 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
“consistently” lacks clarity.  Does the term
“these” refer to every statute listed in
Marek?  Or just to “prevailing party”
statutes?  Does the word “consistently”
mean “exactly the same?”  Certainly
Justice Scalia would refute such a conclu-
sion.  In his concurrence, Scalia states
that inconsistent interpretations “have
been nurtured and preserved by our own
misleading dicta (to which I, unfortunate-
ly contributed).”12 Thus, a conclusion that
Buckhannon extends to all the fee-shifting
provisions listed in Marek rests on shaky
ground.
2.  The Argument that “Prevail” is the
Operative Word
A second issue regarding
Buckhannon’s extension is that “prevail” is
the operative word “from which the term
of art . . . derives its definition.”13 Under
this theory, the term “prevail” “serves as
the predicate for the corresponding statu-
tory interpretation the Court
enunciated.”14 Thus, attaching a defini-
tion and legal consequences to the root
“prevail” means other fee-shifting provi-
sions employing the same word must bear
the same consequences.  Using this argu-
ment, litigants trying to avoid paying
attorney’s fees may extend Buckhannon to
any statute utilizing the root wood “pre-
vail,” including the CWA.
While Buckhannon does not indicate
whether it adheres to this theory, the main
issue in that case was whether a litigant
attained a procedural achievement that
met the legal definition of “prevail.”  Thus,
there seems to be some merit to the argu-
ment that “prevail” is the term a court
should focus on.  However, Black’s Law
Dictionary, which the court seems to have
affinity for,15 defines “prevail” much more
broadly than “prevailing party,” needing
only “success”16 instead of a judgment
rendered by a court.  If “prevail” meant
simply “success” in every statute it was
used, the Buckhannon interpretation and
analysis is surely incorrect.  Thus, this
argument should fail for the simple fact
that, if the root “prevail” is the word one
relies on, the Buckhannon decision is com-
pletely without merit.
3.  The Plain Language Argument
The CWA allows fee awards to two
types of successful litigants:  prevailing
parties and substantially prevailing par-
ties.17 An argument could easily be made
here that since the CWA includes “prevail-
ing parties,” Buckhannon must apply.
Appellate courts have unanimously
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12.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S.at 621 (Scalia, J. con-
curring).
13.  Needlestrades, 202 F. Supp 2d at 280-81.
14.  Id. at 280.
15.  In Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603, the Court
principally relies on Black’s Law Dictionary for its
definition of “prevailing party,” deeming it a “term
of art.”  In dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticizes the
majority for relying too heavily on Black’s, stating
that a contextual interpretation is best suited for
the case at hand.  Id at 628.  As one commentator
has recognized, “[i]f courts resolved controversial
legal issues by the mechanical process of opening
up Black’s Law Dictionary, our nation would not need
judges interpreting the law.”  Paolo Annino, The
Buckhannon Decision: The End of the Catalyst Theory
and a Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 11, 12 (Jan-Feb. 2002).
16.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (6th ed. 1991)
(defining “prevail” as “[t]o be or become effective”;
“to obtain”; and “[t]o succeed”).
17.  Clean Water Act § 505(d).
employing such language.18 It would be
difficult to argue, in light of the Court’s
sanctioning of “prevailing party” as a legal
term of art (and seemingly every court’s
adherence to the rule), that the term
would not also extend to the CWA.  Thus,
those parties achieving Buckhannon’s defi-
nition of prevailing party status should
have little problem securing an award of
fees by the courts.19
In addition, under the CWA, parties
who achieve “substantially prevailing
party” status are also entitled to an award
of fees.  Compared to the term “prevailing
party,” the question becomes whether
“substantial” prevalence requires more
success, the same level of success, or less
success.  Since it is impossible to achieve
greater procedural success than a judicial
order on the merits, any argument that a
litigant must achieve success greater than
“prevailing party” status must fail.  There
is ample room to argue the other two pos-
sible options.
Black’s Law Dictionary fails to define
“substantially prevailing party.”  It does,
however, define the term “substantially”
as “[e]ssentially; without material qualifi-
cation; in the main; in substance. . . in a
substantial manner.”20 No quantifiable
modifiers such as “nearly,” “almost,” or
“approximately” are used - the definition
is limited to substantive success.  In con-
trast, the Supreme Court has recognized
that a “substantially prevailing party”
involves a certain “degree of success.”21
But to determine how much success is
needed, we must turn to other sources.
In at least one instance, Congress has
indicated that it treats the terms identical-
ly.  The Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
states, “[i]n general, the term “prevailing
party” means any party . . . which: (I) has
substantially prevailed with respect to the
amount in controversy, or (II) has substan-
tially prevailed with respect to the most sig-
nificant issue or set of issues presented.”22
Combined with the fact that Black’s give no
guidance on the issue, one could conclude
that the two terms are synonymous.
However, one canon of construction
instructs that statutory use of different
terms evinces congressional intent to
express different meanings.23 There is a
“basic assumption that Congress does not
use different language in different provi-
sions to accomplish the same result,”24
unless Congress specifies otherwise, as
exemplified by the IRC definition above.
In the case of the CWA, Congress seems to
scream this conclusion. Otherwise, why
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18.  Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2002); J.C. v. Reg’l Sch. Dist. 10, 278 F.3d 119, 123 (2d
Cir. 2002); Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268 (4th Cir.
2002); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir.
2002); Booth v. Barton Co., 157 F.Supp. 2d 1178
(10th Cir. 2001). Utility Automation 2000, Inc. v.
Choctawhatchee Elec. Co., Inc., 298 F.3d 1238, 1248
(11th Cir. 2002). Brinckwood Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 288 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
19.  See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.
20.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1428 (6th ed.
1991).
21.  Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
22.  26 I.R.C. § 7430(c)(4)(A) (2002) (emphasis
added).
23.  See Legacy Emanuel Hosp. & Health Ctr. V.
Shalala, 97 F.3d 1261, 1265 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The use
of different language by Congress creates a pre-
sumption that it intended the terms to have differ-
ent meanings.”) (citing Washington Hosp. Ctr. V.
Bowen, 795 F.2d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
24.  U.S. v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1148 (9th Cir.
1999).
shifting language?  Further, another canon
of construction instructs that, when given
two possible choices of statutory interpre-
tation, the choice making the language
ineffectual should be rejected.
So, although the “plain language”
argument fails to decisively resolve the
issue, one gets a sense that achieving the
badge of “substantially prevailing party”
requires something less than a “prevailing
party” according to the CWA.  An inquiry
into the legislative history of the term in
the CWA confirms that this is indeed what
Congress intended.
4.  The “Explicit Statutory 
Authority” Argument; 
Legislative History
In Buckhannon, the Supreme Court
provided litigants, who might otherwise
fail to receive fees under the Buckhannon
rationale, with a narrow window of
escape:  if the successful party can
demonstrate that Congress provided
“explicit statutory authority” for allowing
fees, regardless of the plain language of
the statute, a court may follow Congress’
alternate definition.25 In Buckhannon, the
Court found the legislative history of the
two anti-discrimination statutes at issue
were “at best ambiguous” with regards to
supporting an award of fees under the
“catalyst theory.”26 The Court had previ-
ously noted that, with respect to the CWA,
“[t]he legislative history . . . states explicitly
that the award of costs ‘should extend to
plaintiffs in actions which result in suc-
cessful abatement but do not reach a ver-
dict.’”27 Such “explicit” language clearly
shows a Congressional intent to expand
an award of fees beyond Buckhannon’s def-
inition of “prevailing party.”  But if this
proof is still not enough to persuade a
court that the CWA’s fee-shifting provision
provides a court authority to award fees
for achieving less than “prevailing party”
status, an in-depth look at the legislative
history should suffice.
The original language of section
505(d) of the CWA mirrored that of section
307(f) of the Clean Air Act.  The fee-shift-
ing provisions of each statute stated that
a “court may award costs of litigation
whenever it determines that such award is
appropriate.”28 In Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
a case argued under the Clean Air Act
(CAA), the claimants argued that “it was
‘appropriate’ for them to receive fees for
their contributions to the goals of the
Clean Air Act,” even though the court
rejected all of their claims and their
requested relief.29 Chief Justice
Rehnquist, again writing for the majority,
rejected this argument, holding that
“some degree of success” is required
before it is “appropriate” to award fees.30
According to the Court’s reading of the
CAA’s legislative history, “some degree of
success” can be achieved if the party’s suit
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25.  Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.  For applica-
tion of this principle, see Oil, Chem. And Atomic
Workers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Energy,
288 F.3d 452, 456-57 (D.C. Cir. 2002)(finding leg-
islative history was inconclusive to merit a devia-
tion from the Buckhannon position); Brickwood
Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371
(Fed. Cir. 2002).
26.  Id. at 607, 608.
27.  Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 n.6 (quoting S.
Rep. No. 92-414, p.81 (1971), 2 Leg. Hist. 1499).
28.  Clean Water Act § 505(d); Clean Air Act §
307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f)(1970).
29.  463 U.S. 680, 681 (1983).
30.  Id. at 680.
conduct, although without a formal court
order.”31 Further, the Court itself charac-
terized the legislative history as a “rejec-
tion” of the “prevailing party” standard,
and stated its belief that the provision
“was meant to expand the class of parties
eligible for fee awards from prevailing par-
ties to. . . parties achieving some success,
even if not major success.”32
In 1987, four years after Ruckelshaus,
Congress voiced its support for the
Court’s rationale, and clarified its inten-
tion by amending both statutes to include
the phrase “prevailing or substantially
prevailing party.”33 The Senate Report
describes the purpose of the amendment
as follows:
“The purpose of. . . the amend-
ment to section 505(d) is to clar-
ify the circumstances under
which costs of litigation may be
awarded.  In . . . Ruckelshaus. . .
[the lower court held that] it was
“appropriate” to award attor-
ney’s fees. . . [to a party] even
though the government pre-
vailed on all issues.  The
Committee does not believe
that it is reasonable or appropri-
ate . . . [for a] party to pay the
costs of an opposing party to a
lawsuit when the opposing party
has not prevailed on the issues.
Accordingly, these amendments
would limit the awarding of
costs under the Clean Water Act
to prevailing or substantially
prevailing parties.34
Congress went on to clarify its
intended range of parties who are eligible
for fees under the “substantially prevail-
ing” standard:
[The standard] is not intended to
preclude the awarding of costs to
a partially prevailing party with
respect to the issues on which
the party has prevailed, if such
an award is deemed appropriate
by the court.35
Thus the standard is the same now as
it always was - it is appropriate for a court
to award costs when a party obtains either
(1) a court order, (2) a consent decree, (3)
a private settlement, or (4) defendant’s
abatement of a CWA violation before a
verdict is reached (the “catalyst theory”).36
Congress, spurred on by the Ruckelshaus
decision, simply clarified the provision by
including partially prevailing parties.
In summary, Congress consciously
amended the CWA and explicitly intend-
ed the new language to provide fee
awards to those parties achieving less
than “prevailing party” status.  By
including the more flexible “substan-
tially prevailing” language in section
505(d), Congress recognized the need
to compensate parties for legitimate
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31.  Id. at 686 n.8.
32.  Id. at 687-88. The Court went on to state
that “Congress intended to eliminate both the
restrictive readings of “prevailing party” adopted in
some . . . cases.”
33.  See Clean Water Act 505(d).
34.  S.Rep. No. 50, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 33
(1985).
35.  Id. (emphasis added).
36.  See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 67 n. 6 (“[I]f as a
result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict
is issued, a defendant abates a violation, the court
B.  “Whenever Appropriate”
After a court determines whether or
not the petitioning party has “prevailed”
or “substantially prevailed,” it then has
discretion to award fees “whenever . . .
appropriate.37 Because the Buckhannon
decision does not affect how a court inter-
prets this Congressional grant of discre-
tion, only brief discussion follows.
Several courts have addressed the issue,
although the Supreme Court previously
stated that “it is difficult to draw any
meaningful guidance from [CCA’s] use of
the word ‘appropriate.’”38
The Supreme Court interpreted the
word “appropriate” as “specially suit-
able,” “fit,” or “proper,” taking the defini-
tion from Webster’s Dictionary.39 The
Court has made it clear that it is only
“appropriate” to award fees when a party
has “prevailed,” “substantially prevailed,”
or been “successful.”40 Additionally, the
First Circuit has concluded that the
“whenever appropriate” standard sug-
gests great judicial latitude in awarding
fees, stating: “[t]he purpose of an award
of costs and fees . . . is to allocate the
costs and litigation equitably, to encourage
the achievement of statutory goals.”41 Thus,
most courts tend to interpret this grant
of discretion broadly, mechanically
granting fees if the petitioning party
achieves the required status.42
III. Conclusion
The Buckhannon decision should not
affect how courts award fees under the
Clean Water Act (CWA).  Any indication
within the decision itself that tends to
favor expansion is strictly dicta.  Nor is it
persuasive that in this context the word
“prevail” should be the operative term.
Simply, the plain language of the statute,
combined with explicit language in the
legislative history and prior Supreme
Court interpretation, provide a convinc-
ing conclusion that the Buckhannon
rationale is not applicable to the CWA.
Thus, it is appropriate for a court to award
attorney’s fees to any party achieving
“prevailing” or “substantially prevailing”
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may award litigation expenses borne by the plain-
tiffs.”).  This is the Court’s declaration that the “cat-
alyst theory” is alive under the CWA.
37.  33 U.S.C. 1365(d) (2001).  This standard
has become known as the “whenever appropriate”
standard.
38.  Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 683,
39. Id. (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTER-
NATIONAL DICTIONARY 106 (1976)).
40.  Id. at 683.
41.  Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 484
F.2d 1331, 1338 (1st Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
42.  Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (it is appropriate to award fees under the
CAA when plaintiff meets all prongs of the ‘catalyst
theory” test);  Southwest Center for Biological
Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F.Supp. 2d 944 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (it is appropriate to award fees under the
ESA when plaintiff meets all prongs of the ‘catalyst
theory’ test); Loggerhead Turtle v. Volusia County,
307 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2002) (same theory as













Spring 2003 Attorney’s Fees and the Clean Water Act after Buckhannon
C.W.A. Citizen Suit Resource Guide
1. J. Douglas Klein, Does Buckhannon Apply?  An Analysis of Judicial Application and
Extension of the Supreme Court Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond, 13
Duke Envtl. L. & Pol'y F. 99 (2002).
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/delpf/articles/delpf13p99.htm.
Discusses the applicability of the decision to fee-shifting provision in statutes such
as the Equal Access to Justice Act and the Freedom of Information Act, and ana-
lyzes lower court decisions with respect to the particular level of success a litigant
must achieve before an award may be given.
2. Jennifer T. Buckman & Jeffrey S. Ballinger, Court Tightens Standards for Recovering
Attorneys Fees, Best, Best & Krieger LLP Environmental Law Update (2001).
http://bbklaw.com/CM/Environmental%20Law%20Update/newsletters44.asp#8 
Discusses two cases, including Buckhannon that have made it more difficult to
recover attorneys fees in environmental cases.
3. Marisa L. Ugalde, The Future of Environmental Citizen Suits After Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc.  v. West Virginia Board of Health and Human Resources,
8 Envtl. Law. 589 (2002).
Discusses the purpose and importance of citizen-suit and fee-shifting provisions in
environmental  statutes, and the development of the catalyst theory of attorneys
fees which the Court overturned. The author concludes by examining the repercus-
sions of the decision on future environmental litigation by citizen plaintiffs.
4. Kyle F. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court - Common
Sense Takes a Vacation,  43 B.C. L. Rev. 973 (2002).
Examines the impact of the decisions and recommends that Congress should
enact legislation preserving the catalyst theory and that , in the meantime, courts
should distinguish the fee-shifting provisions at issue in Buckhannon and preserve
the catalyst theory in other statutory contexts.
5. Kasza v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178
Plaintiff not entitled to attorney's under RCRA after Buckhannon.
W
ES
T 

N
O
R
TH
W
ES
T
